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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UJIFUSA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
- vs -

NATIONAL HOUSEWARES, INC.,
Def enda11t and Appellant.

Case No.
11901

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained hy him as a result of
an accident while riding on a snowmobile operated by
defendant's employee David Bigler.

DISPOSl TION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defondant in
tJip amount of $10,000.00 general damages and $194.63
:-;1wcial damages.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant sPPks a reYPrsal of the judgment below.

ST1 ATE1\IENT OF FAC'l'S
The facts out of which this case arisPs an· n·lativ,.1 .
simple and substantially without dispuk
Plaintiff is a commercial photographer. (H. 12S, 1:.'.!J 1
Shortly before December 20, 19GG, lw was contart<>d hy
one Rex Woodruff, an advertising man, to take movi<'s
of people in a snowmobile at Alta, for use in adHrtising
or promotional material. (R. 130) On the afternoon of
December 20, ·woodruff picked plaintiff up at his place
of business, and they then pickPd up David Bigl<'r, YiC'('
president of defendant National HousewarPs, at ib
office on Vine Stret>t, and then proc<>Pded to Alta in
vVoodruff's car. (R. 131) Bigler had a snowmobile on
a trailer, which he removed. (R. 131) Plaintiff had
never previously been on a snowmobil<'. (R. 131)
Plaintiff rode on the snowmobile with Bigler np
the mountain in search of an appropriate place to tah
pictures. Bigler was in front and drove. Plaintiff sat
behind him, straddling the seat. They followed a trail
up the mountain. After locating a snitahle place to
take pictures, they started down the hill following th<'
same trail. Near the bottom, they had an accident. There
was a hump or bump in the road. As the
passed oyer it, the machine left the gronnd, and wlwn
it came down, plaintiff sustained injury, although the
machine did not turn over or upset. (R. 1:t2-1:34, l:J(i)
vVith the assistance of otht>r nH·mh(•rs of the part:<,
plaintiff went ov<'r to the ear and rested for tw<·nty to
thirty minntus. He tlwn went liaC'k up tlie 11ill on the
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:-:110\1111ol1il<>, took sonw photographs, came down the l1ill
nn th( :-:nowmohile, took some more photographs, and
tltl'll cam<· home. (R. 134)
Prior to this time, plaintiff had
a skier and
ltad dmw a lot of skiing. Ile had skied at Alta and was
familiar with the terrain. He knew that the roads up
the mountain were not paved. He knew that they would
he taking a trail, or unimproved road, ·which would have
irregularities in it and would not be smooth. (R. 150, 151)
Plaintiff had no opinion as to the speed of the snowmobile. (R. 156) He did not feel that the speed was
rxc<..'ssive and made no complaint to Bigler about the
manner of operation. (R. 157) As above noted, the snowmobile remained upright after the accident. (R. 156)
Rex Woodruff observed the snowmobile coming
down the trail, and its speed appeared to him to be
normal. He• estimakd that the snowmobile traveled
about ten to twelYe frl't in thc> air. (R. 159)
RiglPr h·stifit•d that he ,,·as familiar \\·ith the trail
and had lwen oHr it lwfon·. (R. 1G7) The hump or
bmnp on which the aceident occurred was created by
hlockagP of the road so automobiles would not go on
the sPrvice road. It was newly created since the last
time that he had passed over the trail. He had noticed
it on the trip np th<· mountain and had driven aronnd
tlH· edgP of it. (R. 1G7) On the return trip, the machine
was travPling about fif'tp0n to
miles per hour.
Jfp intend<•d to drin• <JY<>r tlw lrnmp <·orninµ; do\\·n. How<·nr, h<· did not intc•rnl to jmup tli<> machine. (R. lf)S)
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He explained that with this machinP, the 01wrnt'lr
cannot go over a bump going uphill because this \Y<rn lrl
raise so much of the tread off th(_' surfacu that th<' 111achine would lose traction and "spin out.'' HO\n•n·r, c0111ing downhill, it is normal operation to go over bm111Js
which are less than two fed in height. (R. 182)
The same route was followed on tlw second trip np
the mountain. However, in light of the previous experience, Bigler operated the machine at only fin miles per
hour on the return trip and did not lean the ground
when he passed over the same bump. (R. 168, 169)
Later, efforts were made to take pictures jumping
the machine over the bump. For this purpose, thP machine was operated at its maximum speed of approximately 35 miles per hour. In order to get satisfactory
jump pictures, it was necessary to build up the hump
and enlarge it. Even then, the machine would jump only
about twelve feet, and this without a passenger. (R. 172,
173)
On the evening of the accident, the plaintiff saw
Dr. Robert Lamb. (R. 122) He saw Dr. Lamb again
the next day and, although Dr. Lamb recommended hospitalization, plaintiff elected to wear a back brace and
remain at work. Dr. Lamb saw him for purposes of
treatment on only two other occasions, January 4 and
February 4, 1967. (R. 123) X-rays dl•picted "minimal
degenerative changes" which Dr. Lamb charaderized as
of the "lowest scale of severity." 'l'lwre was no cord or
nerve damage. (R. 124) Degenerative ehangps go on
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m •T<'ryone as part of tJie aging lffllCC'SS. Ile anticipated
that 'lw Jilaintiff would be able to adjust to this diffirnlty and to lirn a normal lifr. (R. 12G)
Plaintiff did not lose any days from work, although
for a period of about ten days aftPr the accident, he
had to lie down occasionally, and ha<l to give up some
outside work. (R. 142, 143) No evidence was offered as
to what loss of profit, if any, he sustained as a result
of this. Thereafter, for a period of approximately nine
wePks, he hired an extra employee to assist with the
work of moving heavy equipment in doing outside work.
(R. 143) The total cost of this was $540.00. (Ex. 14)
This was the only evidence establishing with any degree
of certainty, any loss of income as a result of the accident.
After both parties had rested, defendant made a
motion for directPd verdict, "·hich was denied. (R. 175)
The case \vas submitted to the jury on the issues of
nPgligenc(' on the part of defendant, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and damages. Defrndant submitted requests for instructions, both on the
issues of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
(R. 32, 33) In a colloquy between the conrt and counsel
for the defendant, the court indicated that he had some
question as to whether the issue of contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury. Counsel for the
defondant indicated that lw also had a doubt on that
point, lrnt thought that the issue of assumption of risk
><honld definifrly he snhmitkd to thP jury. (R. 178) Ho\\--
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ever, for reasons not indicated in the r<>cord, the f·o11J"t
elected to submit to the jury the issue of contrihntory
negligence rather than assumption of risk.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND REFUSING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTION.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT
TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF ASSUMPTION OF
RISK ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF.

The bases of defendant's contention that tlw court
should have directed a verdict in its favor are that tlwre
was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant which caused or contributed to cause the accident, and that as a matter of law, plaintiff assumed
the risk. Since the doctrine of assumption of risk is also
the essence of our Point II, and since, as we shall point
out, there is a certain inter-relationship between the
claims of no negligence on the part of dc>fendant and
assumption of risk on the part of plaintiff, we discuss
the two points together.
About the only evidence plaintiff has upon which
to rely, to establish negligence upon the part of the defendant is the fact that an accident occurred. It is axiomatic, however, that the mere occurrence of an accident
is not in and of itself any evidence of negligence. There
is no evidence from which the jury could find that Bigler
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the snowmobile at an excessive or dangerous
ratP of speed. Plaintiff himself testified that he felt
that the speed was reasonable, that he had no concern
about it, and made no protest concerning it. Rex \Voodrnff abo testifit>d that the speed on the descent appeared
to him to be normal. No expert evidence was offered
tending to establish that the normal safe speed was anything different from the speed at which Bigler operated
the machine.
On the issue of proper lookout, the evidence shows
without dispute that Bigler saw the bump or hump and
was aware of it, both going up and coming down the
hill. He cannot, therefore, be said to be guilty of negligence in that regard.
He elected to proceed over the bump, believing that
he could do so without jumping the machine. His judgment proved to be mistaken, but a mere mistake in judgment is not rn•gligence.
He did not lose control of the machine, but held it
m an upright position until it came to rest.
There is no evidence that Bigler was skylarking,
showing off, attempting to give the plaintiff a thrill,
or doing anything other than procPeding in a businesslike manner to move up and down the mountain to accomplish th0 ohjective in whieh all members of the party
\\'ere interested.
Although tlwr<> has h0en consickrable recent literature
eoneerning tlw hazards of snowmohilP 01wration in gen-
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eral and the risks inherent in it, our research has discovered no reported case involving injuries to passengt>rs
on snowmobiles. The case, t11erefore, must lw dPcidPd
on basic principles of negligence law. ·we submit tltat
there is a complete lack of evidence upon which to
a finding that Bigler departed from the ::;tanclard of
reasonable care in his operation of the snowmobile.
Turning to the doctrine of assumption of risk, we
note that this term has been nsed by the courts in varying ways and to mean var)ing things. Primarily,
however, it means that because the plaintiff has consPntf'd
to the risk, the defendant has no duty toward him. See
2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Section 21.1,
page 1162:

"* * * In its primary sPnse the plaintiff'::; assumption of a risk is only the counterpart of the defendant's lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from
that risk. In such a case plaintiff may not recDnr
for his injury even though he was quite rPasonable in encountering the risk that caused it. Volenti non fit injuria. (2) A plaintiff may also be
said to assume a risk created by dPf Pndant's
breach of duty towards him, when he deliberately
chooses to encounter that risk.
"
and op.cit., page 1163:
"The term assumption of risk in its primary
sense refers to risks that are incidental to a relationship of free association betwe('n plaintiff and
defendant, that is to say, one which either is at
liberty to take or leave as he will. In such a case
defendant's duty toward plaintiff is limited. It
does not extend to the use of care to make the
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conditions of the rPlationship reasonably saf P at most the duty is one of eare to mak<• tlwse
('()nditions as safe as they appPar to he and it may
fall short of that. If tl1esP risks arP fully eomprelH'nded, or
obvious, or of the kind which
plaintiff and not defendant must look out for,
then plaintiff will be held to have assumed them
by voluntarily entering into the rPlationship which
entails them .... "

It has been said by this court in several cases that
knowledge or comprehension of the risk by the plaintiff
is the watchword of assumption of risk. However, as
pointed out in Harper and James, this is not always
true. See 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Section 21.2, page 1168:

"It is sometimes said that knowledge or com-

prehPnsion of the risk by plaintiff is the watchword of assumption of risk. In many types of
situations this is true; in others it is not. Unless
the limitations which should be put on such a
statement are fully apprt>ciated, it may be very
misleading. There may be assumption of a specific risk of which the plaintiff is completely ignorant.... "
and also, page 1170:

" ... It seems

safe to say, however, that
there are at least somf' situations whose dangers
are so obvious, so customary, and so commonly
known that a defendant nePd give no warning of
them. Hert> again a plaintiff may assume a risk
that lw does not in fact comprehend.... "
'l'he same authors furtlwr observt> that voluntary participants in lawful gamt>s and spo1is assume the risk of
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injnry at the hands of their frllm,- participanb. Se(• page
1181.
Similar language is ns<'d hy Pross<'r:
" ... In its simplest and
s<>ns<·, it mean,;
that thl' plaintiff has giwn his ex1n·<·ss cons<·nt
to relie\-p the defendant of an obligation of' conduct toward him, and to take his rlmnr<' of injm?
from a lrno\\11 risk. The rPsult is that the U<'f endant is simply nnd<'r no legal duty to proteet
the plaintiff. A second, and closely related m<'aning, is that the plaintiff, with knowledge of the
risk, has entered voluntarily into sonw r<'lation
with th<' defendant which
im-olves it,
and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agT<'Ping to take his own chances. . . . " Prosser on
Torts, Second Edition, Section 55, page 303.

And, at page 307 the same author says:

" ... By enteri11g frrrl11 and volwntari.!11 into mn1
relatio·n or sit11atio11 u'71ich presr11ts olnious do11ger, the plaintiff may be taken to arcqJt it, and
to agree that he will look out for himself, arnl
relieve the defondant of
Those
who participate or sit as s1wetators at sports
and amusement::; assurn<> all the obvious risks of
being hurt hy roller coastPrs,
halls, fir(•works Pxplosions, or the strnggl<'s of tlw eontl>stants. 'The timorous may sta11 at home.' ... Tlie
co11se11t is found in qoi11q ahead irith full J,;1101rledgc of the risk." (Emphasis ours.)
See further, page 310:
"At the
time, it is eYident that in all sneh
cases an ohj<•ctive standard mnst be appliPd, and
that th<• plaintiff ca1111ot lie heard to ::;ay tliot lie
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dirl 1wt comprehend a risk which must lw1;e l;cen
oln;ions to him. As in thP eas<' of neglig-<>m·P ibself,
there are cerfai,11 risks u'71ich am1011e of arlu1t aqe
must 7Jc takc11 to a1JJJrcci11te: .. . "(Emphasis ours)
\'<'!':-' similar lang11ag0 is found in the Re . .;tat,,nu'nt of
the Laze of Torts Scco11d, in comrnent ''c" under Section

49GA.
\Yhile this conrt has lwl'n rctict>nt to apply the doctri1w of assumption of risk to automohil0 tn)e cases, it
has iw·ogniz0d its place in cases involving sports, either
a:-; a participant or s1wctator, 'dtt>re the hazard is of a
tn>e '"hieh should he perceiwd by a person of ordinary
expPrience and prudt>ncc•.
In Harnilton vs. Salt Lake City Corporation, 120
G-±7, 237 P.2d 841, the plaintiff was held to have
assnnwd the risk of being struck by a foul ball while
attending a baseball game.
In Tannehill rs. Terry, 11 Utah 2d 368, 359 P.2d
911, this court held that it was not error to submit the
issnP of assumption of risk to tht> jury in a case where
the plaintiff was struck in the face by a golf club by the
<lf·fendant. In that ease, the plaintiff had no more knowl
rdge of the game of golf than did the plaintiff here of
snowmobiling.

In Harrop vs. Beckman, 15 Utah 2d 78, 387 P.2d
554, this court recognized that the doctrine would be
applicable to the risks incident to water skiing. The doctrint> was not applied in that cast>, sincP it did not apply
to th<' 1wgligPnee of the ch•fondant, the operator of another
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boat who collided with the plaintiff after the plaintif'r
lost her water skis and was dislodged from the hoat
which was towing her.
The most recent expression from this court on this
subject is found in Foster vs. Steed, 459 P.2d 1021, where
it said:
"Where the trial court has rd'mw<l to snhmit
the issues to the jury, and has ruled on tlwm as
a matter of law, his action can pro1wrly be sustained only if the evidence compels findings in
accordance with his ruling. . . . Accordingly, if
under any reasonable view of the evidence, and
the inferences that fairly may be derii:cd therefrom, the jury coidd remain m1co11vi11ced on such
issues, the directed verdict was wrong and the
issues should have been submitted to the jury.''
(Emphasis ours.)

It was accordingly held that the issnPs of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk should ha\'<' been suhmitted to the jury, and not determined hy the court as
a matter of law. We submit that if 11laintiff was not
guilty of assumption of risk as a matter of law, there
was at the very least substantial evidence upon \\·hich
a jury could have found as a matter of fact that he
was guilty of assumption of risk. He had skied at Alta
and was familiar with its terrain. He was aware that
the trail over which he would travel was not a smooth
one, and that it would have irrPgulariti<>s in it. '!'hr
nature of the machine was open and apparent. (8Pr exhibits 15, lG, 17, and 18.) Plaintiff was aware that the
machine would necessarily pass over depressions, hm11ps,
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UJIFUSA vs. NATIONAL HOUSEWARES, INC.
CORRECTION TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

The following case was decided by this court
after Appellant's Brief was printed and filed, and
is cited in support of Points I and II of Appel-

lant's Brief.

It should follow immediately after

the quotation from Foster vs. Steed at the middle
cl page 12:

Calahan vs. Wood,

Ut.2d

, 465 P.2d 169.
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rises, and irret,'1Jlarities in its vath, and as a reasonable
1wn;on must havP known that wlwn it did so, it would
qnitP probably leave th<· ground and travPl for some
distance through the air. He mnst have been equally
mindful that when it returned to tlw ground, th<>re would
lw some impact to the ridc•r, and, of cotirsP, any n·rtical
itupad to tlw spine earriPs some risk of injury. These
risks th<> plaintiff must be deemed to have known, understood and voluntarily assmned.
POINT III

THE DAl\IAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY WERE
EXCESSIVE.

As has been pointed out in our statement of facts,
the injury sustained by the plaintiff did not require him
to ht> hospitalized and, in fact, it was necessary for him
to see his doctor only on four occasions, the last of which
was approximately six weeks after the injury occurred.
l t was not necessary for him to take any time away from
his work. He demonstrated no loss of income as a result
of his injury, except the cost of hiring an assistant for
a couple of months during the time that plaintiff was
unable to do heavy lifting. His expense for medical
care was minimal, and his doctor characterized his injury as "minimal" and of the "lowest scale of severity."
In the face of this evidence, the jury awarded the
plaintiff $10,000.00 general damages, in addition to his
k]wcial darnag<>s. Defendant contends that this award for
p:<·1wral dmnages is
and either should have
lH·<>n r<>duced, or a new trial granted.
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"\Ve rPcognize that dc•cisions in other cases arr of
limited vallte in appraising the ad<•q\rney .i,
... _
ness of a jury award. As said by this court in Duf f.71 1. 1.
Union Pacific Railroad Compa11y, l 18 Ptah S:2, :218 P.:2d
1080:
deeidPd cas<'s an· of littl<> value in
fixing present day standards or in assisting courts
in determining excrssive awards. Both the comt
and jury are rPquin•d to dt>al 1\-ith many unkno\rn
factors and a good guess is about tlH· lwst that
can be hoped for. The permissihl<' minimum and
maximmn limits within which a jury may oprratc
for a given injury are pn·s<>ntly far apart and
must continue to be widespread so long as pain
and suffering must be measured by money standards . . . . "
However, we believe that the cases hereinafter cited
are sufficiently similar on their facts and sufficiently
analogous to the case at bar to he of some vahw to the
court in passing upon our contention hen·. In tlie case
of Shrpard vs. Payne, 60 Utah 140, 20G P. 1098, this
court held a $10,000.00 VPrdict exc(•ssive and ordered a
reduction to $7,500.00. This court there said:
"'Vhile W<' do not rPgarcl the VC'rdict as th<· n•sult
of passion and prejudi<'e, \H' an• com·inc<'d that it
is excessive, and therPfor<• nnjust to the def<·1Hlant. GrPat latitnc1<' is n<'c<'ssaril)· allmn•d to a
jury in asspssing damag<·s for JH'rsonal injuries.
A plaintiff who is entit!Pd to damages should lie
full)- compemmted. No v<>rdict is right which fails
to cornpensat<>; non<• is right whi<'h rnon• tlian c·on1pensates. The trial judg<• sl1onld not in tliis ea,;1•
have granted a n<'w trial, but, in the exercis<' of
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his discrPtion, lw should haw n•quin·d illaintiff to
n·mit part of t!1P jndgment, and, in tlw ('VPnt of
rdu:-:al, :-:houlcl Jun·<' grant<•d tlw motion for a new
trial. ... "
In the ahow-<1uot<•d case of Duffy rs. Union Pacific
Ha ii road C 0111JHI11.11, an FELA ca:-:(•, the jury rdurnl'd a
verdiet of $12,GOO.OO for lH'rsomtl injnries, reclncl'd hy
tlw arnonnt of $:3,500.00 for plaintiff's contributory negligPneP, making a nd venlict of $9,000.00 In that case,
tlw plaintiff had to undl'rgo surgery and was hospitalized
for a lWriod of thirteen days. He lost approximately
$1,300.00 in lost 'rngl's, leaving a gross award for general
,]amag(_•s of $11,200.00 In holding that amount excessive
and in ordering a rl'mittitur of $4,000.00, this court said:
"\Ye must assunw that th<' jury awarded plaintiff the snm of $1,::JOO for loss of wages, which
W<'l'<' his only Pstahlished s1wcial damages, and
this )paws the sum of $11,200 for general damag<•s. \\Then \\·e gl't in this domain reasonable
minds might differ as to what amotmt is excessive.
Hmvpver, there must h(_' a limit
which a
reasonable jnry cannot go and the limit must be
dPtl>rmi1wd on th<' gross amonnt of the verdict
and not the nPt amount. Conceding that jurors
in diffen•nt states and counties han different
stanclarch; and different ideas as to the
n1ltw of pain and snffrring; that prt>sPnt da:v costs
of living an· comparatiwly high; that the purcliasing powN of tlw dollar has decrPased to approxirnatPi>· orn•-half of \\·hat it 'vas sonw ten years
ago; that \Ve art>
in an inflationary
spiral; and, that hy all reasonah!P standards verdids should be larg'('l" than tlH•y \\'l'l'l' at that
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period; \VE' arc, rn'v0rtlwl«ss, of the op1mon n1
this case that the damages mYanlPd hy th" .illl,
have no foundation in fact, and arP so
excessive and exorbitant as to convince tlw men;_
bers of this Court that the verdict is far in exC'P,;.;
of what a reasonable jury could det('rrninP as tlw
maximmn amount awardahle for this type of injury. For these reasons it ap1wars to us to
have been given under the influence of passion
and prejudice.''

In Stamp vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 5
Utah 2d 397, 303 P.2d 279, plaintiff sustained an injury
to his eye, which required him to be in the hospital for
four days and to lose eleven days from work. The jury
awarded $12,500.00 damages and deducted $2,500.00 on
account of plaintiff's contributory negligence, leaving
a net verdict of $10,000.00. In holding this award excessive and ordering a remittitur of $4,000.00, this court
said:
"In our opm10n it cannot be justly denied that
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in Duffy v.
Union Pacific R. Co. were of much longer duration and well calculated to result in morP 1wrmanent disability. Duffy, like Stamp, suffered extreme pain; he was off work three and one-half
months compared to the 1:3 days that plaintiff
in this case was off.
"\Ve are of the opinion that tlw a\\·ard ma(k• hy
the jury has no basis in fact. Such an mnrnl is
so Pxcessive as to he shorking to onP's cons<'i('n<'('
and to
indir·ate passion or prejndie(', and
it abundantly app<'ars that therP is no evide11cP
to support or justify the wrdict. rl'he trial court
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abused its discretion in rPfusing to grant a new
trial or in ordering a rPmittitur.''
Similar reasoning was followed in the case of Ruf
rs. Association for World Trai·el Exchange, 10 Utah 2d
249, 351 P.2d 623. We also invite attention to the case of
Loddcr vs. Western Pacific Railroad Company, 123 Utah
31G, 259 P.2d 589. In the opinion in that case, there are
eollt>ctrd decisions from this court wherein remittiturs
ranging from 25 per cent up to 50 per cent have been
ordrred or approved. Under the criteria heretofore
established by this court, the award of general damages
in this case is excessive and a remittitur should be
ordered or a new trial granted.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to prove any negligence on the part
of the defendant and the evidence shows that plaintiff
assmned the risk as a matter of law, and the verdict and
judgment should be set aside with directions to enter
jndgmmt in favor of the defendant, no cause of action.
Alternatively, the judgment should be reversed and remanded for a new trial with directions to submit the
issue of assumption of risk to the jury. The verdict is
excessive and if the judgment on liability is permitted to
stand, a remittitur should be orderrd.
Respectfully submitted,
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